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A SPOUSE'S RIGHT TO CONTROL ASSETS
DURING MARRIAGE: IS NORTH
CAROLINA LING IN THE MIDDLE
AGES?
THE HONORABLE K. EDWARD GREENE*
I. INTRODUCTION
Under the modern concept of marriage, a husband and wife
are generally thought of as equal partners, and the wife is gener-
ally no longer thought to be under the domination of her hus-
band.' Ironically, this concept of treating a husband and wife as a
partnership is reflected upon divorce in North Carolina's equitable
distribution laws, but is not entirely reflected during the intact
marriage, especially with regard to issues of property
management.
II. NORTH CAROLINA
A. History
According to William Blackstone, the principle existed at com-
mon law that upon marriage, "the husband and the wife are one
person in law; that is the very being or legal existence of the
* Judge Greene is currently serving on the North Carolina Court of
Appeals.
1. Mims v. Mims, 305 N.C. 41, 49, 286 S.E.2d 779, 785 (1982).
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woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorpo-
rated and consolidated into that of the husband" so that a "unity
of person" was acquired.2 This principle governing marriage con-
tributed, at least in part, to the disabilities burdening the married
woman. 3 For example, upon marriage, a woman's personal prop-
erty vested absolutely in the husband,4 and any personal property
the woman acquired during the marriage likewise became her
husband's property. 5
As for real property, the husband, upon marriage, became
seized of his wife's estates of inheritance in land during coverture
and had the right of possession and control.6 The husband "could
appropriate all the rents and profits to his own use and could sell
and convey the land for a period. not exceeding the coverture,"7
and the wife's personal estate as well as the husband's interest in
her real property were subject to levy under execution to satisfy
his debts.8 While the wife retained the fee, however, she could not
convey it even with her husband's consent, unless by a fine. 9 The
common law, endorsing the fiction of the husband and wife's
unity, also prevented a married woman from making contracts,
either with her husband or with others.' °
There were correlative duties imposed upon the husband. For
example, the husband had the duty to support his wife." He was
2. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 442
(Thomas M. Cooley ed., 1884); See also Perry v. Stancil, 237 N.C. 442, 75 S.E.2d
512 (1953) (briefly discussing the history of the common law in North Carolina).
3. BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at 44.
4. 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 130 (13th ed. 1884);
O'Connor v. Harris, 81 N.C. 204 (1879); Arrington v. Yarbrough, 54 N.C. 57
(1853).
5. 3 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 526 (3d ed. 1923); 2
FREDRICK POLLOCK & FREDRICK W. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 404 (3d
ed. 1968) [hereinafter POLLOCK].
6. 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 5, at 525; 2 POLLOCK, supra note 5, at 404;
Perry, 237 N.C. at 445, 75 S.E.2d at 515.
7. Perry, 237 N.C. at 445, 75 S.E.2d at 515; see also 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra
note 5, at 525; 2 POLLOCK, supra note 5, at 404.
8. 1 SAMUEL F. MORDECAI, LAW LECTURES 291-92 (2d ed. 1916); J.W. Oler,
Annotation, Curtesy Initiate, or Inchoate Right of Curtesy, as Subject to Claims of
Husband's Creditors, 133 A.L.R. 633 (1941).
9. 1 MORDECAI, supra note 8, at 291-92; 1 RICHARD R. POWELL & PATRICK J.
ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 109[1] (1995); 3 CHESTER G. VERNIER,
AMERICAN FAMILY Laws 293 (1971).
10. 2 POLLOCK, supra note 5, at 405; 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at 442.
11. See Manby v. Scott, 86 Eng. Rep. 781 (1659).
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liable for his wife's prenuptial debts.12 He was liable for torts his
wife committed before and during the marriage, 13 and he was
responsible for any crimes his wife committed in his presence. 4
The wife was and is also entitled to a dower or life estate in one-
third of the land held in fee by her husband at his death. 15
B. Reform of the Common Law
In the middle and late nineteenth century, all states enacted
a series of statutes, known as Married Women's Property Acts, to
change the disabilities of a married woman at common law. 16 The
general purposes of the Acts were (1) to remove the common law
disabilities of married women, and (2) to equalize the rights of the
husband and the wife. The Acts, among other rights, gave mar-
ried women the right to purchase, own and transfer property with-
out their husbands' involvement, the right to make a will, the
right to sue and be sued individually, the right to contract and
keep their earnings, and the right to testify in civil and criminal
trials. 17
The reform of traditional common law with the Married
Women's Property Acts can be seen in North Carolina's Constitu-
tion. First in 1868 and amended in 1964, the North Carolina Con-
stitution provided:
PROPERTY OF MARRIED WOMEN SECURED TO THEM
The real and personal property of any female in this State
acquired before marriage, and all property, real and personal, to
which she may, after marriage, become in any manner entitled,
shall be and remain the sole and separate estate and property of
such female, and shall not be liable for any debts, obligations, or
engagements of her husband, and may be devised and bequeathed
and conveyed by her... .'8
This provision ended the traditional common law concept that the
husband and wife were one with the man in charge and control.
To effectuate this reform, North Carolina's legislature has, from
12. 1 JAMES SCHOULER, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND DOMESTIC
RELATIONS § 76 (6th ed. 1921).
13. 1 id. at § 122.
14. 1 id. at § 56.
15. 2 POLLOCK, supra note 5, at 404; I AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §§ 5.1-
5.49 (James Casner ed., 1952); see 2 ROBERT E. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY
LAw § 107 (1980).
16. 1 SCHOULER, supra note 12, at § 287.
17. KATHERINE T. BARTLETT, ET AL., FAMILY LAw 95 (2d ed. 1991).
18. N.C. CONST. amend. X, § 4.
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time to time, promulgated statutes, mainly contained in Chapter
52 of the North Carolina General Statutes, entitled "Powers and
Liabilities of Married Persons." Under these statutes, married
women have the same rights and capacities to make contracts as if
single, 19 the earnings of a married woman are her separate prop-
erty,2 ° suits are allowed between husband and wife for damages
sustained,21 and contracts between a husband and wife are per-
mitted, if not against public policy.22
One provision governing land held by a husband and wife as
tenants by the entirety, however, lingered in North Carolina until
1983. A husband and wife were, and are now permitted to own
real property as tenants by the entirety, where the parties take
title to the whole indivisible estate as one person.23 Each party
has the whole estate, and neither party has a separate estate or
interest; however the survivor is entitled to the entire estate or
interest and the right of the survivor to the entire estate cannot be
defeated by the wishes of the other party. Until 1983, during the
existence of the tenancy by the entirety, the husband had absolute
and exclusive control, use, possession, rents, income and profits
from the property.24 In 1983, this anomaly passed from us as well
with the enactment of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-13.6, which provides
that a
husband and wife shall have equal right to the control, use, pos-
session, rents, income, and profits of real property held by them in
tenancy by the entirety. Neither spouse may bargain, sell, lease,
mortgage, transfer, convey or in any manner encumber any prop-
erty so held without the written joinder of the other spouse. 25
If the spouses own property as tenants in common,26 they
each own a separate, equal, undivided interest in the land and
19. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-2 (1991).
20. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-4 (1991).
21. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-5 (1991).
22. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-11 (1991).
23. PATRICK K. HETRICK & JAMEs B. McLAuGHLIN, JR., WEBSTER'S R&M,
ESTATE LAW IN NORTH CAROLINA § 7-4 (1994) [hereinafter WEsTERs'S] ("An estate
by the entirety is a form of co-ownership held by husband and wife with the right
of survivorship.").
24. 2 LEE, supra note 15, at § 115.
25. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-13.6 (1984).
26. Any conveyance to a husband and wife creates a tenancy by the entirety,
"unless a contrary intention is expressed in the conveyance." N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 39-13.6 (1984). Thus, a husband and wife may take title as tenants in common.
WEBSTER'S, supra note 23, at § 7.3.
206 [Vol. 18:203
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have an equal right to possession and control.27 Each tenant in
common has the right to convey, lease, or mortgage his interest in
the common property.28 He has no authority, however, to bind his
co-tenant unless he has authority to do so. 29
The reforms, however, gave the wife no control or manage-
ment rights over property titled in her husband's name, and under
standard property rules, title determines the right to manage and
control property.30 Although the reform of traditional common
law helped to remove married womens' disabilities, it did not help
a married woman who owned no significant property of her own
because she had no access to her husband's property.3 ' Under
this system, each spouse retains individual ownership of real and
personal property titled in his or her name, and has total control
and management of that property, including the right to dispose of
it without any obligation to share with, or consult with the non-
titled spouse.32
C. The Issue
The issue presented by North Carolina's common law system
is whether there are any remedies for a spouse during an intact
marriage when the other spouse dissipates marital assets, and if
not, whether such remedies need to be in place.
III. REMEDIES AVAILABLE IN NORTH CAROLINA
A. Dissolution of the Marriage
North Carolina, along with other common law states, has
moved in the direction of treating the marriage as a partnership
at the time of dissolution. Principles adapted from the community
property system achieve an equitable distribution of marital prop-
erty, without placing the emphasis on title as is done during the
27. WEBSTER'S, supra note 23, at § 7.3.
28. Id. at § 7.6.
29. Id. ("[T]he mere relationship of tenancy in common does not create an
agency relationship.").
30. Id. Traditional forms of ownership of property focus on the person or
entity in which the property is titled. See Hagler v. Hagler, 319 N.C. 287, 292,
354 S.E.2d 228, 233 (1987).
31. WEBSTER'S, supra note 23, at § 7.3.
32. Nanette K. Laughrey, Uniform Marital Property Act: A Renewed
Commitment to the American Family, 65 NEB. L. REV. 120, 123 (1986).
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marriage.33 As stated by the North Carolina Supreme Court,
"[e]quitable distribution reflects the idea that marriage is a part-
nership enterprise to which both spouses make vital contributions
and which entitles the homemaker spouse to a share of the prop-
erty acquired during the relationship."34 "The goal of equitable
distribution is to allocate to divorcing spouses a fair share of the
assets accumulated by the marital partnership"35 in order to accu-
rately reflect the theory that "both spouses contribute to the eco-
nomic circumstances of a marriage, whether directly by
employment or indirectly by providing homemaker services."3 6
Therefore, although only one spouse may have title to all the mari-
tal assets during the marriage, "an equal division is made
mandatory (emphasis in text) '[upon divorce] 'unless the court
determines that an equal division is not equitable.' "37 The effect
of North Carolina's Equitable Distribution Act, therefore, is "to
give the non-title spouse an equitable claim in marital property""
upon divorce.3 9
33. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20 (1995); see generally 1 ROBERT E. LEE, NORTH
CAROLINA FAMILY LAw § 34 (4th ed. 1979 & Supp. 1985) (discussing the law prior
to the enactment of the Equitable Distribution Act where property accumulated
by parties to a marriage went, upon divorce, to the person in whose name the
property was titled). "The right to equitable distribution of marital property is a
species of common ownership. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(k) (1984). A new concept
of ownership is created by the statute, unknown at common law." Hagler, 319
N.C. at 297, 354 S.E.2d at 236 (Martin, J., dissenting).
34. White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 775, 324 S.E.2d 829, 832 (1985).
35. Dissipation of Assets, 1 Equitable Distribution Journal 73 (1984). See also
LAWRENCE J. GOLDEN, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY 255 (1983).
36. GOLDEN, supra note 35, at 3.
37. White, 312 N.C. at 776, 324 S.E.2d at 832(discussing N.C. GEN. STAT. 50-
20(c)).
38. Hagler, 319 N.C. at 290, 354 S.E.2d at 232. The Court also notes,
however, that the Act "does not displace the traditional principles of property
ownership. Thus, in the absence of an equitable distribution... the state of the
title of property owned by either spouse or by both spouses is unaffected.
Nothing in the act creates a new form of ownership such as that recognized in
'community property' states." Id.; see Scott Greene, Comparison of the Property
Aspects of the Community Property and Common-Law Marital Property Systems
and their Relative Compatibility With the Current View of the Marriage
Relationship and the Rights of Women, 13 CREIGHTON L. REv. 71 (1979).
39. North Carolina's equitable distribution scheme "has aptly been
characterized as a 'deferred community property law' system." Sally Sharp,
Equitable Distribution in North Carolina: A Preliminary Analysis, 61 N.C.L.
REv. 247, 249 (1983). "Pursuant to the 'deferred community property' equitable
distribution scheme in North Carolina, community property principles do not
apply during marriage. If, however, the marriage ends in divorce, the property is
208 [Vol. 18:203
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To help insure that one spouse has not wasted marital prop-
erty thereby depriving the other spouse of his or her equal share
in the partnership, North Carolina's equitable distribution statute
provides that a court may consider acts of either party "to waste,
neglect, devalue or convert such marital property, during the
period after separation of the parties and before the time of distri-
bution"40 as a distributional factor. This section, however, only
addresses any mismanagement of marital property occurring after
separation and not during the marriage. In 1985, the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court interpreted Section 50-20(c)(12), which allows
the court to consider as a distributional factor "[any other factor
which the court finds to be just and proper,"41 to include "miscon-
duct during the marriage which dissipates or reduces the value of
marital assets for nonmarital purposes."42
This interpretation of Section 50-20(c)(12) raises questions
concerning what is meant by "misconduct during the marriage."
In other words, how far before the date of separation will miscon-
duct which dissipates marital property be considered as a distri-
butional factor under Section 50-20(c)(12) and what actions are to
be included within the meaning of "misconduct?" The Court gave
as one example that such misconduct "might be, e.g., the convey-
ance by one spouse of marital assets in contemplation of
divorce."43 The spouse which desires the court to consider dissipa-
tion of marital assets before separation under Section 50-20(c)(12)
has the burden, at least with respect to joint accounts, to present
clear and convincing evidence that the other spouse used the
assets for non-marital purposes without consent.4 4 The North
Carolina Court of Appeals has stated "it would be 'disastrous to
distributed according to community property principles." Elizabeth A. Cheadle,
The Development of Sharing Principles in Common Law Marital Property States,
28 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1269, 1282 (1981). See also UNiF. MARrrAL PROP. ACT § 4, 9A
U.L.A. 109 cmt. (1983)("Those family-law interests set forth in marital property
definitions in equitable distribution statutes are delayed-action in nature and
come to maturity only during the dissolution process."). Johnson v. Johnson, 317
N.C. 437, 443, 346 S.E.2d 430, 433-34 (1986).
40. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c)(11a)(1995).
41. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c)(12)(1995).
42. Smith v. Smith, 314 N.C. 80, 81, 331 S.E.2d 682, 683 (1985); see Lawrence
v. Lawrence, 100 N.C. App. 1, 22, 394 S.E.2d 267, 278-79 (1990) (Greene, J.,
concurring in the result). For an update on dissipation issues, see Dissipation of
Assets - Update, 11 EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION JOURNAL 85 (1994).
43. Smith, 314 N.C. at 88, 331 S.E.2d at 687 (citing Hursey v. Hursey, 326
S.E.2d 178 (S.C. Ct. App. 1985)).
44. Id.
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marital felicity' to require one spouse, after a number of years of
using for family purposes the other spouse's estate which has been
deposited to a spousal joint account, to account to the other spouse
for the sums expended," and that "[p]ublic policy, ever interested
in the maintenance of a harmonious marriage relation, prohibits a
contrary rule."45 Although there is some protection in an equita-
ble distribution proceeding for a spouse when the other spouse dis-
sipates marital assets prior to separation, the small number of
cases on this issue indicate this right is limited.46 In South Caro-
lina, the Court of Appeals refused to consider in an equitable dis-
tribution action that the husband had given money to his mother
totaling between $25,000 and $30,000 over the course of twenty
years without his wife's knowledge or consent because "there is no
evidence that John gave his mother money in contemplation of
divorce or with intent to deprive Barbara of her right to equitable
distribution."47
One spouse or the other may have spent marital funds fool-
ishly or selfishly or may have invested them unprofitably. The
statute wisely prevents the other spouse from resurrecting these
transactions at the end of the marriage to gain an advantage in
the equitable distribution. Were it to do otherwise, human greed
and vindictiveness would transform the courts into "auditing
agencies for every marriage that falters."48 . . .In the absence of
fraudulent intent, it is not unlawful for spouses to make outright
gifts to others during the marriage.4 9
45. McClure v. McClure, 64 N.C. App. 318, 323, 307 S.E.2d 212, 214-15 (1983)
(quoting Spalding v. Spalding, 198 N.E. 136, 139 (Ill. 1935)), cert. denied, 310
N.C. 308, 312 S.E.2d 651 (1984).
46. The wife's offer of evidence tending to show her husband withdrew
$30,850 from joint assets from 1981, when the difficulties in the marriage
started, to May 11, 1983, when the parties separated, "did not offer clear and
convincing evidence that [the husband] alone withdrew the funds without
defendant's consent and used the funds for purposes other than sustaining the
family" and "was insufficient to overcome the presumption that she consented to
plaintiff's withdrawals or that plaintiff dissipated the marital assets prior to
separation." Id. See also Lawrence, 100 N.C. App. at 22-23, 394 S.E.2d at 278-79
(Greene, J, concurring in the result) ('[in an equitable distribution proceeding,
the trial judge properly considers evidence of actual dissipation of marital assets
for non-marital purposes by either spouse in anticipation of separation as a
distributional factor").
47. Panhorst v. Panhorst, 390 S.E.2d 376, 379 (S.C. Ct. App. 1990).
48. Id. (quoting In re Marriage of Getautas, 544 N.E.2d 1284, 1288 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1989)).
49. Id.; see also In re Marriage of Aud, 491 N.E.2d 894 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)
(husband's expenditure of $70,000 to support his widowed mother did not
[Vol. 18:203210
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Therefore, North Carolina does protect one spouse from the other
spouse's mismanagement of marital property titled solely in his or
her name during the marriage, but only if the parties are divorc-
ing,50 and only if the economic misconduct dissipates marital
assets in anticipation of divorce.
B. Death of Spouse
North Carolina, like all common law states, in an effort to pre-
vent one spouse from disinheriting the surviving spouse, has
promulgated laws granting to the surviving spouse the right to
dissent from the will of the decedent spouse.5 ' Under the dissent
statute, as a general rule, the surviving spouse is assured of
receiving at least the same share of the properties owned by the
decedent spouse he would have received had the decedent spouse
died intestate.52 These statutes, like the equitable distribution
statutes, are based on the principle that the marriage is like a
partnership where both spouses share, to some degree, in the own-
ership of the properties, however titled. Not unlike the situation
that can arise at the time of the dissolution of the marriage, the
surviving spouse is not protected from disinheritance by inter
vivos transfers of property by the deceased spouse.53 Some courts,
in an effort to prevent disinheritance, have set aside inter vivos
transfers upon a showing that the decedent spouse had an intent
constitute dissipation of marital assets in contemplation of divorce and should
not be considered in equitable distribution) and Robinette v. Robinette, 736
S.W.2d 351 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987) (cash gifts of wife to her sister were not in
dissipation of marital estate even though made without husband's knowledge
because not made in contemplation of divorce or with intent to deprive husband
of his proportionate share of marital property).
50. Under the community system, the nonacquiring spouse has a vested,
present ownership interest in one-half of the community property. If the
same property were similarly acquired in a common-law state, the
nonacquiring spouse would have no vested, present interest in the
property. At most, such a spouse would have a form of inchoate
expectancy in a portion of the property in the event that the acquiring
spouse predeceases or a potential right to a portion of the acquiring
spouse's property on divorce.
Greene, supra note 38, at 87.
51. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-1 (1992)(granting surviving spouse right to dissent
from deceased spouse's will).
52. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3 (1992).
53. NoRmAN A. WIGGINS, WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES IN NORTH
CAROLINA, § 158 (3d ed. 1993).
9
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to deprive the surviving spouse of any interest in the property.54
Other courts have held that inter vivos transfers are "illusory"
and have refused to recognize them in computing a surviving
spouse's rights under the dissent statutes.5 5 These methods of
avoiding inter vivos transfers, however, have been recognized as
inadequate.5 6 As one commentator has noted, "[t]he answer to the
problem seems to lie in the adoption of legislation which will pro-
tect the surviving spouse from disinheritance by means of any
device which will accomplish the result that the dissent statutes
were designed to prevent, namely, disinheritance by will."57 The
problem of disinheritance by use of inter vivos transfers is not
presented in a community property state because a decedent
spouse has the right "to dispose of only his one-half share of the
community property."5 8
C. Other Remedies Available in North Carolina During the
Intact Marriage
Spouses who are tenants in common with each other are
required to account to their co-tenant for their share of any rent
received from the common property and reimburse them one-half
of the rents and profits. 59 The co-tenant spouse is also entitled to
damages if he disposed or excluded from possession by the other
co-tenant.6 ° This is consistent with the general principle that ten-
ants in common have a quasi-fiduciary obligation to each other
and are required to "be true to each other and protect the rights of
each other in the property.""' Furthermore, the tenant in com-
54. See McGee v McGee, 26 N.C. 105 (1843).
55. Newman v Dore, 9 N.E. 2d 966 (N.Y. 1937); Moore v. Jones, 44 N.C. App.
578, 583, 261 S.E.2d 289, 292 (1980); but see In re Estate of Francis, 327 N.C.
101, 109, 394 S.E.2d 150, 157 (1990) (holding that funds in a joint account with a
third party established by the decedent were not part of deceased's spouse estate
for dissent purposes).
56. Philip Mechem, Why Not a Modern Wills Act?, 33 IowA L. REV. 501
(1948)(suggesting a statute enumerating the inter vivos transfers which would
be inoperative as to the surviving spouse).
57. WiGoNs, supra note 53, at § 158.
58. Id.; see MODEL PROBATE CODE, § 33 (1946)(any gift by married person
within two years of his death "is deemed to be in fraud of the marital rights of his
surviving spouse").
59. WiGGINs, supra note 53, at § 158.
60. Id.
61. Id. ("The relationship between co-tenants has been described as a
community of interest which gives rise to a community of duty... which disables
each tenant from doing anything that would prejudice the others in reference to
212 [Vol. 18:203
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mon spouse has a claim for waste.62 Although the statute does not
address the issue, it would appear that spouses holding title as
tenants by the entireties would have the same quasi-fiduciary
obligation to each other and would have access to the same type of
claims available to tenants in common. The common law remedy
of constructive trust may in some instances provide relief to a
spouse who claims the other spouse is "holding property under cir-
cumstances making it inequitable for him to retain it." 63
The North Carolina Court of Appeals recently rejected a claim
that spouses in a marriage have a common law duty to exercise
good faith and integrity in their dealings with each other, similar
to a duty partners have to each in a business transaction.6 4
IV. OTHER APPROACHES
A. Community Property States
1. History
Eight states can trace their law governing spousal property
rights and marriage to a community property system having
the common property"); see Smith v Smith, 150 N.C. 81 (1908)("These relations of
trust and confidence bind all to put forth their best exertions and to embrace
every opportunity to protect and secure their common interest and forbid the
assumption of a hostile attitude by either").
62. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-536 (1983)(creates action for waste against "a joint
tenant or tenant in common"); Our Supreme Court, recognizing that equitable
distribution is merely an alternative means of property division, stated that "in
the absence of an equitable distribution of entireties property under N.C.G.S.
§ 50-20, an ex-spouse (now tenant in common) retains the right to possession and
the right to alienate and may bring an action for waste, ejectment, accounting, or
partition." Hagler v. Hagler, 319 N.C. 287, 292, 354 S.E.2d 228, 233 (1987)
(citing WEBSTER'S, supra note 23, at §§ 112-24).
63. Wilson v. Crab Orchard Dev. Co., 276 N.C. 198, 211, 171 S.E.2d 873, 882
(1970); see Lamb v. Lamb, 92 N.C. App. 680, 684-86, 375 S.E.2d 685, 687-88
(1989) (defendant, in requesting equitable distribution, did not make an election
of remedies barring her action for a constructive trust because there was no
determination of whether the properties were marital or separate, whether funds
had been exchanged for some other property, whether the funds had been
dissipated or wasted, and, if so, when; trial court was therefore unable to
determine from the record whether the equitable distribution would allow
redress of the injury complained of in the constructive trust proceeding, and the
equitable distribution action itself had not yet been prosecuted to a final
judgment); but see Brown v. Boeing Co., 622 P.2d 1313 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980)
(court in community property state rejects constructive trust remedy).
64. Smith v. Smith, 113 N.C. App. 410, 413, 438 S.E.2d 457, 459, (1994) cert.
denied, 336 N.C. 74, 445 S.E.2d 37 (1994).
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French or Spanish roots: Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana,
New Mexico, Nevada, Texas and Washington. 65 The basic prem-
ise of the community property system is that marriage is a part-
nership with each spouse contributing in their own way.66 "The
law does not focus on the quantity or the quality of these contribu-
tions" and each spouse is vested with a one-half ownership inter-
est in the community property. 67  Community property is
generally defined as all property acquired by either spouse during
the marriage except if by devise, gift, or inheritance.6 8 Under
original systems of community property in the eight community
property states, married women were at a disability during the
marriage because the husband had sole management authority
over all community property, and the wife's interest in the com-
munity property during marriage was described as a "mere expec-
tancy."69 During the 1970s, reform occurred in the community
property states to improve the wife's position with regard to com-
munity property by removing the husband as exclusive manager
of all the community property during marriage.7v
2. Arizona: An Example of a Community Property System
Community property states have developed several
approaches to the management of community property. Although
one state follows the "divided management" approach,71 the most
common approach is known as the "joint-either" or "equal man-
agement" approach.72 This approach "reasons that because both
65. HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES (2d ed. 1988).
66. Laughrey, supra note 32, at 122.
67. Id.
68. 4A RICHARD POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 625.1 (Patrick Rohan rev. ed.,
1982); see ARiz. REV. STAT. § 25-211 (1988); UNIF. MARITAL PROP. ACT § 4, 9A
U.L.A.' 109 (1987).
69. Van Maren v. Johnson, 15 Cal. 308, 811 (1860); see Susan Prager, The
Persistence of Separate Property Concepts in California's Community Property
System, 1849-1975, 24 UCLA. L. REV. 1, 35-39, 47-52 (1976).
70. The gender allocation of managerial rights allowing the husband to sell or
exchange community property without the wife's consent was declared
unconstitutional in Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981) which dealt with
former Art. 2404 of the Louisiana Civil Code.
71. TEx. FAm. CODE ANN. § 5.22 (West 1995) (each spouse is given sole
management authority over all community property in the sole name of that
spouse).
72. See ARIz. REV STAT. ANN. § 25-214 (1995); CAL. Crv. CODE § 5125 & § 5127
(West 1990); NEv. REV. STAT. § 123.230 (1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-13 &
214 [Vol. 18:203
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spouses hold present, equal interests in all marital property, the
management and control of that property should also be equal."73
This method grants to either spouse the right to manage and con-
trol the community property, however, there is one exception
which is broadly recognized. The acquisition, disposition or
encumbrance of the community real property requires the consent
of both spouses.74 Some states require the consent of both spouses
to sell or encumber community personal property necessary to the
functioning of the home. 75 Some restrict gifts of community prop-
erty unless both parties consent. No community property states
have adopted the rule that both spouses' consent is required for
every management decision.77
Arizona's statute is a good example of the approach taken by
a community property state with regard to the management and
control of the community property. It grants each spouse the abil-
ity to act alone and bind the community except for certain enu-
merated transactions, most of which require both spouses'
consent.
A. Each spouse has the sole management, control and disposi-
tion rights of his or her separate property.
B. The spouses have equal management, control and disposition
rights over their community property, and have equal power to
bind the community.
C. Either spouse separately may acquire, manage, control or dis-
pose of community property, or bind the community, except that
joinder of both spouses is required in any of the following cases:
1. Any transaction for the acquisition, disposition or encum-
brance of an interest in real property other than an unpat-
ented mining claim or a lease of less than one year.
2. Any transaction of guaranty, indemnity or suretyship.78
§ 40.3-14 (Michie 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.16.030 (1995); see Wendy A.
Wake, Uniform Marital Property Act: Suggested Revisions for Equality Between
Spouses, U. ILL. L. REV. 471, 488 (1987); J. Thomas Oldham, Management of the
Community Property Estate During the Intact Marriage, 56 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 99, 114 (Spring 1993).
73. Wake, supra note 72, at 488.
74. CAL. Crv. CODE § 5127 (West 1990).
75. See e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 5125(c)(West 1990).
76. NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.230 (1993); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030 (1995).
77. BARTLEir, ET AL., supra note 17, at 98.
78. ARiz. REV. STAT. § 25-214 (1995); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030
(1995).
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As could be expected, some problems in the management of
community property can arise when both spouses have the right
to control and manage the same property. When problems occur,
the first spouse to have acted usually prevails. 79 As one commen-
tator noted: "It might encourage a spouse to act preemptively. For
example, if one spouse wants to sell an item of community prop-
erty and the other does not, the spouse wishing to sell cannot be
stopped, unless the other is willing and able to hide the item." °
3. Mismanagement of Community Property by One Spouse
In addition to establishing principles of dual or coequal man-
agement of community property, the community property states
generally provide an assortment of remedies for actions by a
spouse inconsistent with the management theories.81
In California, each spouse, in making management decisions,
must "act in good faith," and has "the obligation to make full dis-
closure to the other spouse of the existence of assets in which the
community has an interest and debts for which the community
may be liable, upon request ....8 82 Negligent mismanagement is
not considered a breach of the good faith standard.83 A spouse can
bring an action for breach of this duty of good faith if the breach
"results in substantial impairment to the claimant spouse's pres-
ent undivided one-half interest in the community estate."8 4 Fur-
thermore, California allows either spouse during the marriage to
request an accounting to "determine the rights of ownership in,
the beneficial enjoyment of, or access to, community property, and
the classification of all property of the parties to a marriage."85
79. See Brown v. Boeing Co., 622 P.2d 1313 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980) (where
husband made selection of retirement benefit without consent of his wife and
selection provided no benefit to the wife upon the husband's death).
80. Oldham, supra note 72, at 114; see Richard K. Effland, Arizona
Community Property Law, Time for Review and Revision, 1982 ARiz. ST. L.J. 1,
15(" 'equal' management is fine in theory but is unrealistic in practice.").
81. BARTLETT ET AL., supra note 17, at 99-100.
82. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5125(e)(West 1990).
83. Oldham, supra note 72, at 157; LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 2354 (West
1985)(spouse liable for loss or damage to community property only if caused by
fraud or bad faith); but see Janet Mary Riley, Women's Rights in the Louisiana
Matrimonial Regime, 50 TuL. L. REV. 557, 570 (1976)(manager spouse
considered as fiduciary and held to same standard as trustee).
84. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5125.1(b)(West 1990).
85. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5125.1(a)(West 1990); see Carol S. Bruch, Protecting the
Rights of Spouses in Intact Marriages: The 1987 California Community Property
Reform and Why It Was So Hard to Get, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 731.
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In Texas, each spouse is the sole manager of the community
property that "he or she would have owned if single," giving each
spouse sole control over his or her earnings. 86 The manager of
community property, however, cannot "unfairly dispose of the
other spouse's one-half interest in the community."87 Further-
more, a husband in Louisiana successfully petitioned the court for
judicial separation of property, alleging his interest in the commu-
nity was threatened to be diminished by his wife's fault, neglect,
or incompetence.8 8 In California and Wisconsin a spouse may
petition the court to add the spouse's name to the title of the prop-
erty which may facilitate the added spouse's management power
over the community property.8 9 For example, if both spouse's
names are on the title to an automobile, a third party purchasers
will likely require both spouses to consent to its sale. The Wiscon-
sin statute permits a court, if it determines that marital "property
has been or is likely to be substantially injured by the other
spouse's gross mismanagement, waste or absence," to terminate a
spouse's management authority or partition the community estate
into two separate estates.9"
In general, the community property states have attempted to
employ a system to insure that the rights of spouses with regard
to community property are protected not only upon dissolution of
the marriage and at death, but also during the marriage by insur-
ing that title alone does not vest in one spouse the ability to waste
community property during the marriage.
86. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.22 (West 1993); See BARTLETT ET AL., supra note
17, at 100.
87. Mazique v. Mazique, 742 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. App. 1987).
88. Pan Am. Import Co., Inc. v. Buck, 452 So. 2d 1167 (La. 1984); see LA. Civ.
CODE ANN. art. 2374 (West 1985) which provides that "when the interest of a
spouse in a community property regime is threatened to be diminished by fraud,
fault, neglect, or incompetence of the other spouse, or by the disorder of the
affairs of the other spouse, he may obtain a judgment decreeing separation of
property." This statute allows one spouse to end the community property regime
without having to dissolve the marriage, thereby protecting the sanctity of the
family unit. Does this remedy, however, essentially turn the marriage into one
governed by principles analogous to the common law system?
89. CAL. CIv. CODE § 5125.1 (West 1990); Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 766.70 (West
Supp. 1995); see also UNIF. MARITAL PROP. AcT § 15(c), 9A U.L.A. 133 (1987).
90. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 766.70(4)(a)(West 1993).
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B. The Uniform Marital Property Act
In 1983, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws promulgated the Uniform Marital Property Act
(the Act) which adapts some of the principles governing a commu-
nity property system to the common law. Under the Act, all the
property acquired during the marriage, with certain exceptions, is
treated as marital property, with each spouse having a right of
joint and equal ownership in that marital property. 91 Although
ownership is shared, with each spouse having an undivided one-
half interest in the marital property, the management and control
of the property is title based.92 In other words, unlike most com-
munity property states, the management and control of the mari-
tal property is given to the spouse who has legal title.93 If the
property is not titled, the property is to be managed by either
spouse. 94 The Act specifically provides the following:
§ 5. Management and Control of Property of Spouses
(a) A spouse acting alone may manage and control:
(1) that spouse's property that is not marital property;
(2) except as provided in subsections (b) and (c), marital prop-
erty held in that spouse's name alone or not held in the name
of either spouse;
(3) a policy of insurance if that spouse is designated as the
owner on the records of the issuer of it;
(4) the rights of an employee under an arrangement for
deferred employment benefits that accrue as a result of that
spouse's employment;
(5) a claim for relief vested in that spouse by other law; and
(6) marital property held in the names of both spouses in the
alternative, including a manner of holding using the names of
both spouses and the word "or".
(b) Spouses may manage and control marital property held in the
names of both spouses other than in the alternative only if they
act together.
(c) The right to manage and control marital property transferred
to a trust is determined by the terms of the trust.
(d) The right to manage and control marital property does not
determine the classification of property of the spouses and does
not rebut the presumption of Section 4(b).
91. UNIF. MARITAL PROP. AcT § 4, 9A U.L.A. 109 (1987).
92. Laughrey, supra note 32, at 132.
93. Patrick N. Parkinson, Who Needs the Uniform Marital Property Act?, 55
U. CINN L. REv. 677, 678 (1986-87).
94. Id. at 678; UNIF. MARITAL PROP. AT, § 5(a)(2), 9A U.L.A. 114 (1987).
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(e) The right to manage and control property permits gifts of that
property only to the extent provided in Section 6.
(f) The right to manage and control any property of spouses
acquired before the determination date is not affected by this
[Act].
(g) A court may appoint a [conservator, guardian] to exercise a
disabled spouse's right to manage and control marital property.95
Although the Act continues to allow one spouse to control marital
property titled in his or her name, the Act does provide that
"[e]ach spouse shall act in good faith with respect to the other
spouse in matters involving marital property or other property of
the other spouse."96 Although the Act does not define the parame-
ters of the good faith requirement, the drafters of the Act state
that the spouses are not to be considered as "trustees or guaran-
tors toward each other."97 Instead the spouse in control of the
asset "must proceed with an appropriate regard for the property
interests of the other spouse and without taking unfair advantage
of the other spouse."98 As stated by one commentator,
[tihe title holder does not have a duty to be perfect, but neither
should the title holder be allowed to take advantage of the
spouse's trust and confidence. A husband and wife are expected to
care for each other, and should not engage in a property transac-
tion that benefits one at the expense of the other. This would
undermine the trust that is an essential component of the marital
relationship. Conduct that breaches that trust should be a viola-
tion of the good faith requirement.99
Several remedies are provided for a spouse whose spouse acts
inconsistent with the good faith standard.
§ 15. Interspousal Remedies.
(a) A spouse has a claim against the other spouse for breach of the
duty of good faith imposed by Section 2 resulting in damage to the
claimant spouse's present undivided one-half interest in marital
property.
(b) A court may order an accounting of the property and obliga-
tions of the spouses and may determine rights of ownership in,
95. UNIF. MARITAL PROP. AcT § 5, 9A U.L.A. 114 (1987). Complete text of the
Act appears in Uniform Marital Property Act Symposium, 21 Hous. L. REV. 595
(1984).
96. UNIF. MARITAL PROP. AcT § 2, 9A U.L.A. 107 (1987).
97. UNIF. MARITAL PROP. ACT § 2, 9A U.L.A. 107 cmt. (1987).
98. Id.; See Laughrey, supra note 32, at 136 ("non-title holder is not required
to prove fraud in order to establish a breach of the good faith standard").
99. Laughrey, supra note 32, at 136-37.
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beneficial enjoyment of, or access to, marital property and the
classification of all property of the spouses.
(c) A court may order that the name of a spouse be added to mari-
tal property held in the name of the other spouse alone, except
100
Section 15 does not permit the non-title holder to retrieve title
from a third party. A bona fide purchaser for value, therefore,
takes the property free of any claim the non-titled spouse has for
breach of the good faith duty.101 The comment to section 15 sug-
gests that the accounting remedy would not "be the classic fiduci-
ary accounting in either style or substance."10 2 Instead, the
accounting is intended to "simply establish what is marital prop-
erty and what is not" in order to provide a basis for separating the
title to the property if necessary to protect the ownership interest
of the non-titled spouse.10 3
Although the Act governs property rights during the mar-
riage, it necessarily has an impact on testamentary devises.
Because each spouse owns one-half of the marital estate, regard-
less of how it may be titled, the decedent spouse is only able to
devise that one-half interest. The other one-half interest is owned
by the surviving spouse as a matter of law. Whether the surviving
spouse should also be given an elective share of the decedent's
one-half interest of the marital property is not an issue addressed
in the Act.
Only one common law state, Wisconsin, has adopted the Act
to date.'0 4 Statutes in Wisconsin create an action prohibiting all
conduct "that breaches the duty of good faith in matters involving
marital property or other property of the other spouse" before a
divorce action is filed.' 0 5 This remedy is no longer available once a
divorce action is filed.10 6
V. WHICH SYSTEM IS BEST?
A review of the common law system and the community prop-
erty system discloses two fundamentally different approaches to
100. UNIF. MARITAL PROP. AcT § 15, 9A U.L.A. 132-33 (1987).
101. See Laughrey, supra note 32, at 137.
102. UNIF. MARITAL PROP. AcT, § 15, 9A U.L.A. 133 cmt. (1987).
103. Id.
104. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 766.001-.097 (West 1989).
105. Gardner v. Gardner, 499 N.W.2d 266, 268 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993); see Wis.
STAT. ANN. § § 766.15 & 766.70(1)(West 1993).
106. Gardner, 499 N.W.2d at 268.
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the control and management of property acquired by the spouses
during the marriage. Under the common law system, the owner-
ship and control of the property belongs to the spouse having title
to it. In the community property system, each spouse owns a one-
half interest in the property acquired during the marriage and
they share the management of that property. The Uniform Mari-
tal Property Act, although based on the community property prin-
ciple of equal ownership, embraces a management form similar to
the common law system with the additional requirement that that
managing spouse exercise good faith in the process.
Which system is best? It depends on the philosophy or system
of values the society chooses to adopt. The community property
system promotes the ideal of marital sharing. The common law
property system promotes the ideal of individuality. The
husband and wife [in a common law system] are not required to
share their property with each other. They are not treated as an
economic unit. Rather, their property interests are largely unre-
lated to their status as husband and wife. This [system] promotes
the ideal of individuality. Equality between the spouses is
achieved by giving each of them the right to keep whatever they
can produce. 107
Marriage in a community property system
is treated as an economic partnership. Each partner is expected to
sacrifice their individual rights in order to promote the best inter-
ests of the partnership. The loss of individual rights is justified by
the identifiable benefits that result from participation in the mari-
tal unit. Economic equality between the spouses is achieved by
giving each one-half of the fruits of the marital partnership.' 08
The states utilizing the common law system, including North
Carolina, are trying to have it both ways. They have adopted
equitable distribution acts based on the partnership concept of
marriage, 10 9 in an effort "to alleviate the inequities" caused by the
107. Laughrey, supra note 32, at 142.
108. Id.; see UNIF. MARITAL PROP. AcT prefatory note, 9A U.L.A. 97-102
(1987)(the partnership model represents a "system of elemental fairness and
justice so that those who share in the many and diverse forms of work involved in
establishing and maintaining a marriage will have a protected share in the
material acquisitions of that marriage").
109. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20-22 (1995); White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 775, 324
S.E.2d 829, 832 (1985)("Equitable Distribution reflects the idea that marriage is
a partnership enterprise to which entitles the homemaker spouse to a share of
the property acquired during the relationship."); Loeb v. Loeb, 72 N.C. App. 205,
209, 324 S.E.2d 33, 37 (1985)("The Act reflects a trend nationwide towards
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common law title system at the time of divorce. 1 0 They have also
long recognized the right of a surviving spouse to share in the
estate of a decedent spouse, without regard to how the property
might be titled.11' Yet, the case law of these same states contin-
ues to adhere to the common law management and control princi-
ples which are based on the concept that each spouse, during the
marriage, has absolutely no obligation to the other spouse. The
consequence is that the spouse having title to property, even if
obtained during the marriage, can act with impunity with regard
to that property. The assets may be completely dissipated, leav-
ing the non-titled spouse with no remedy during the marriage and
ineffective remedies at the time of divorce or death of the titled
spouse. 112
In trying to have it both ways, these states have seriously
undermined their desire to apply partnership principles at the
time of divorce. 1 13 Furthermore, if partnership principles are
appropriate to order the distribution of assets at the time of
divorce and influence the distribution of assets at death, they are
no less appropriate to govern the management and control of
assets acquired during the marriage. Although this may be incon-
sistent with the tenet that the state should not interfere with an
ongoing marriage, 1 14 the law has an obligation to define marriage
in a way that will stabilize it and thus promote the best interest of
recognizing marriage as a 'partnership, a shared enterprise' "); Hinton v. Hinton,
70 N.C. App. 665, 668, 321 S.E.2d 161, 162 (1984)("marriage relationship is to be
viewed as, among other things, an economic partnership"); Sally Sharp, The
Partnership Ideal: The Development of Equitable Distribution in North Carolina,
65 N.C.L. REV. 195, 198 (1986-87).
110. Mauser v Mauser, 75 N.C.App 115, 119, 330 S.E.2d 63, 65 (1985).
111. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 40-50, 53-58 and accompanying text.
113. It can be argued that with the adoption of the equitable distribution
statutes, the common law states established the partnership principle, not only
for the distribution of assets at the time of divorce, but also the management of
marital property during the marriage. To hold otherwise would establish
competing systems, one based on partnership principles (at divorce) and one not
(during marriage and before separation), with the later system undermining the
former. This argument apparently was not raised in Smith v. Smith, 113
N.C.App 410, 413, 438 S.E.2d 457, 459 (1994) cert. denied, 336 N.C. 74, 445
S.E.2d 37 (1994), where the Court of Appeals rejected the argument that spouses
have a fiduciary duty to each other similar to the duty partners own to each
other.
114. Parkinson, supra note 93, at 695-96.
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society. 115 Applying partnership principles throughout the mar-
riage will provide stability to the marriage because it will provide
a recognized standard for management decisions and a method for
resolving property disputes, short of divorce. Furthermore, to the
extent that the parties to the marriage wish to reject the partner-
ship principles of management and control, they may elect to do
so.116
The decision to adopt the partnership principles of property
management, however, does not fully answer the question of how
the property acquired during the marriage should be managed.
Which is better: the equal or joint management concept of the
community property states or the view adopted in the Uniform
Marital Property Act which places full management and control in
the titled spouse subject to a good faith requirement? As noted,
equal or joint management can create problems with each spouse
competing for the right to manage an item of community prop-
erty. 117 On the other hand, under the Act the non-titled spouse
has no right to interfere in the actual management of the property
and is limited to actions against the titled spouse for breach of
good faith. This balance between partnership principles and
spousal autonomy, however, is a good one and eliminates the
problems of equal control. The non-titled spouse is vested with a
one-half interest in the marital property and given remedies for
management abuses that occur during the marriage. These reme-
dies include the right to seek a court order to add her name to the
title or to divide the property between the parties, establishing
separate property in each spouse."-8
VI. CONCLUSION
There are differing views on whether there should be judicial
interference in disputes that arise between spouses in an intact
115. Laughrey, supra note 32, at 143-44.
116. UNIF. MARrrAL PROP. AcT § 3, 9A U.L.A. 108 (1987) ("marital property
agreement may vary the effect of this Act"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52B-4(a)(1987)
(premarital agreement may include the "rights and obligations of each of the
parties in any of the property of either or both of them whenever and wherever
acquired or located"); see HARRY D. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 110 (2d
ed. 1986)(suggesting that the best solution "may be to impose neither the
[common law] nor the community property regime... but to require all intending
marriage partners to opt into one regime or the other at the time of their
marriage").
117. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 97-104 and accompanying text.
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marriage concerning management of property. Some posit that a
couple needing judicial intervention in disagreements over the
management of marital property are inevitably heading for
divorce.'1 9 Realistically, the vast majority of management dis-
putes that arise during the intact marriage will either be solved
privately by the parties, or the parties will divorce, in which case,
any mismanagement may, in some circumstances, be considered
when distributing marital property equitably. Nevertheless, hav-
ing statutes or allowing lawsuits to rectify any mismanagement
by one spouse during the intact marriage may facilitate the par-
ties' willingness to come to an agreement or discourage the parties
from mismanaging or otherwise wasting marital property. In the
absence of an agreement and where the parties are not discour-
aged from mismanagement, the courts need to be available to pre-
vent abuses. Furthermore, such statutes would preserve the
marital assets for distribution at the time of divorce or death.
The Uniform Martial Property Act provides a solid framework
on which to pattern a statute that would extend partnership prin-
ciples to a marriage, not only at the time of divorce and death but
during the marriage. The Act will need to be modified some to
adjust the definitions of marital and separate property to conform
to those already established in the Equitable Distribution Act.'2 °
It will also be necessary for the legislature to address whether the
surviving spouse should continue to possess a statutory right to
dissent. If the dissent statutes are left as they presently exist,
one-half of the marital property will pass at death to the surviving
spouse and the surviving spouse will also have a right to inherit
an intestate share of the decedent's remaining one-half interest.
This large percentage of the marital estate passing to the surviv-
ing spouse may not represent sound public policy.
119. Oldham, supra note 72, at 116; but see Marjorie M. Shultz, Contractual
Ordering of Marriage: A New Model for State Policy, 70 CAL. L. REV. 204, 325-28
(1982), for a differing view.
120. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(1) and (2)(defining marital and
separate property) with UNIFORM MARTIAL PROP. ACT § 4, 9A U.L.A. 109 (1987).
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